

# LEARNING FROM LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES RESOURCE MANAGEMENT VIA INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION

TINE DE MOOR (T.DEMOOR@UU.NL)

RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR HISTORY AND CULTURE

UTRECHT UNIVERSITY

# SOME SIMILARITIES BETWEEN PAST & PRESENT

- Many developing countries today
  - Have a large majority of the population still highly dependent on (natural) resource management (farmers, fishers etc.)
  - Do not have a strong, well-functioning state
  - Face weakening family ties due to migration
- Late Medieval/Early Modern Europe:
  - Large majority population dependent on farming and fishing
  - Very fragmented European state
  - Increasing market-development but still unreliable
  - Weakening family ties due to new marriage pattern



# CURRENT Spectrum of institutional arrangements to govern resources

State/public

Market/private



# Diversified spectrum of institutional arrangements to govern resources

State/public

Institutions for  
collective  
action

Market/private



# DIFFERENCES IN

- Historical Europe:
  - Bottom-up formation of institutions for collective action since late ME
  - Top-down dissolution since late 18th century
  - Currently: collective resource management disappeared from collective memory
- LDCs:
  - Potential for collective resource management still available, often well established, but threatened by both market and state
  - Interesting solutions to local resource provision and management



# WHAT ARE INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION?

- Within both economic and non-economic spheres
- « artificial families »: formation of durable alliances not (primarily) based on kinship but on other common characteristics, such as occupation
- Formed from below/bottom-up
- Self-governing/autonomous
- Self-enforced exclusion
- Minimal recognition from local governments




# WHAT ARE THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ADVANTAGES OF ICAs?

- Economies of scale
- Collective bargaining position towards authorities
- Sharing risks and resources
- Lower search and information costs
  - internal agreement on the price of the goods
  - collective meetings with compulsory attendance
- **Reduced transaction costs:** reciprocity can be transferred over generations
- **Policing and enforcement:**
  - prevention of freeriding via social control



# FROM SOCIAL DILEMMA TO INSTITUTION






## DIFFERENT FORMS


- Commons
- Guilds
- Waterboards
- Common irrigation systems
- Cooperatives
- ....



# MARKE RAALTERWOOLD (OVERRIJSEL, NETHERLANDS), (BEFORE) 1445 – 1859




Markenboek 1615 (inc





# ESKDALE COMMONS (CUMBRIA, ENGLAND)

## MIDDLE AGES – C. 1859




Common rights: pasture, peat and turves, bracken



# GEMENE AND LOWEIDEN (NEAR BRUGES, BELGIUM): 14<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY–TODAY

Common rights: mainly  
pastureland



# RESILIENCE THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY AND ADAPTABILITY

- Right institution for right problem: no-one-size-fits-all
  - Long-term survival as indicator of sustainability of institutional framework:
    - How do institutions react to external shocks?
    - What kind regulation is effective and efficient?
    - How do rules affect each other within the same institution? When are they complementary?
- > need for an “institutional toolbox” that includes long-term dynamics
- Ostrom (et al.):
- IAD-framework (institutional analysis development)
  - Grammar of institutions (“Understanding institutional diversity” (2005))

Two examples of effective regulation:

1. Monitoring & sanctioning
2. “Anti-commercialisation” rules



# 1. SELF-GOVERNANCE: MONITORING AND SANCTIONING

- Commoners set-up their own regulation and restricted their own behaviour:
  - Right to vote in meetings (linked to household)
  - Obligation to attend meetings
  - Election of representatives
  - Rotation of responsibilities
- **Management tools**
  - Provision of monitors and systems of sanctions for malefactors
    - often graduated fines: 3 strikes and you're out
  - Enforcement of collective exploitation
  - Increasing regulation of grazing on the commons
    - Limiting of commercial activity
    - Limits on the amount of each resource to be appropriated



## 2. DEALING WITH THE MARKET: RULES AGAINST OVER-USE DUE TO COMMERCIALISATION

1. Limitation of the number of cattle in relation to the capacity of resource:
  1. Cattle had to be in possession of user during previous winter
  2. Grazing of cattle bought before grazing period was restricted
  3. Grazing cattle of non-entitled users was forbidden
  4. Linkage of the number of cattle to surface of arable in private property
2. Selling products from the common was forbidden (outside the village)
3. Use of common limited to own needs



# WHAT MAKES A COMMON SUCCESSFUL: IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF OSTROM'S VIEW

- Importance of resilience: long-term survival of institutions (reduces costs)
  - > long-term historical research is essential to understand institutions
- stress on self-governance: bottom-up formation and management
  - > Recognition of capability of local communities to avoid tragedies and solve dilemmas in a cost-effective way

BUT: common management is no guarantee for success: good institution building and participation is required

More examples?

–See International Association for the Study of the Commons

([www.iascp.org](http://www.iascp.org))

–M. De Moor et al., The management of common land in North-Western Europe, 1500–1850, 2002, Brepols






# DESIGNING COMMONS AS RESILIENT ICAs: OSTROM'S DESIGN PRINCIPLES

Table 1.1 Design principles illustrated by long-enduring CPR institutions

1. *Clearly defined boundaries*  
Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself.
2. *Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions*  
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring labor, material, and/or money.
3. *Collective-choice arrangements*  
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules.
4. *Monitoring*  
Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behavior, are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators.
5. *Graduated sanctions*  
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both.
6. *Conflict-resolution mechanisms*  
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials.
7. *Minimal recognition of rights to organize*  
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities.
8. *For CPRs that are parts of larger systems:  
Nested enterprises*  
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organised in multiple layers of nested enterprises.

Source: Ostrom, 1990: 90, Table 3.1

# ASPECTS OF RESILIENT COMMON POOL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT



# LEARNING FROM RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN LDCs?

- Institutions for collective action are “closest” to problems of resource management but extrapolation of model to large scale resource management is possible
- Identify methods and techniques to set-up resilient institutions for collective action → institutional tool-box
- Revive and recognise our own rich history in common pool resource management



# SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITIES ON COMMONS

[HOME](#) [ABOUT](#) [JOIN/SUPPORT IASC](#) [CONTACT US](#)

Search



## The International Association for the Study of the Commons

The leading professional association dedicated to the commons

[NEWS](#) [GLOBAL CONFERENCES](#) [REGIONAL CONFERENCES](#) [COMMONS DIGEST](#) [LIBRARY RESOURCES](#) [MEDIA](#) [IMPACT STORIES](#)

SHARE [f](#) [t](#) [e](#) [...](#)




### Impact Stories

The International Association for the Study of the Commons (IASC) has brought together an impressive array of evidence from around the world that communities are able to manage common property resources effectively and sustainably. But there is more to IASC than just great ideas, theory, and even cutting-edge research: we also have impact on the ground.

[Read More](#)

1 **2** 3 4





## International Journal of the Commons

### Vol 5, No 1 (2011)

Special feature: The 20th anniversary of *Governing the Commons* - Part 1 (Guest Editors: F. van Laerhoven and E. Berge)

Special feature: Commons created by technology: The radio spectrum (guest edited by E. Berge and E. Kranakis)

#### Table of Contents

#### The 20th anniversary of *Governing the Commons* - Part 1 (Guest Editors: F. van Laerhoven and E. Berge)

Frank van Laerhoven, Erling Berge	<a href="#">editorial</a> <a href="#">pdf</a>
The 20th anniversary of Elinor Ostrom's <i>Governing the Commons</i>	1-8
Lee Anne Fennell	<a href="#">abstract</a> <a href="#">html</a> <a href="#">pdf</a>
Ostrom's Law: Property rights in the commons	9-27
Carol M. Rose	<a href="#">abstract</a> <a href="#">html</a> <a href="#">pdf</a>
Ostrom and the lawyers: The impact of <i>Governing the Commons</i> on the American legal academy	28-49
Thráinn Eggertsson	<a href="#">abstract</a> <a href="#">html</a> <a href="#">pdf</a>
The evolution of property rights: The strange case of Iceland's health records	50-56
Oran Young	<a href="#">abstract</a> <a href="#">html</a> <a href="#">pdf</a>
Land use, environmental change, and sustainable development: The role of institutional diagnostics	66-58

#### Commons created by technology: The radio spectrum (guest edited by E. Berge and E. Kranakis)

Erling Berge, Eda Kranakis	<a href="#">editorial</a> <a href="#">pdf</a>
----------------------------	---

**Igitur**

Utrecht Publishing & Archiving Services

Congratulations to editorial board member Elinor Ostrom, winner of the 2009 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel. [More...](#)



The IJC is a publication of The International Association for the Study of the Commons (IASC).

[More...](#)



IJC managing editor Frank van Laerhoven on open access publication (Interview).

[More...](#)



NWO: Data Infrastructures for the Study of  
Guilds and Other Forms of Collective Action  
(2007–2011)

ERC: “United We Stand”. The Dynamics and  
Consequences of Institutions for Collective  
Action in Pre-Industrial Europe’ (2010–2014)

→ More on these projects?

See: <http://www.collective-action.info/projects-2>

*Traditionally, economic theory has by and large been a theory of markets or, more precisely, about market prices. However, there are at least two reasons why economic science should extend beyond price theory. First, **markets do not function properly unless suitable contracts can be formulated and enforced.** Hence, we need to understand the **institutions** that support markets. Second, **considerable economic activity takes place outside of markets** – within households, firms, associations, agencies, and other organizations. Hence, we need theories to explain **why these entities exist and how they work.***

*(Introduction to Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences 2009)*

